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Chapter One. 
The Challenge to The Traditional Conception of Truth. 
Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche challenged the traditional 
conception of truth and reason ... 
Kierkegaard's view that contra Hegel philosophy was the concern 
of the individual human being is seen in his account of 
Socratic Irony, 
Which led to his concept of truth as subjectivity/inwardness, 
Resulting not ln positive doctrine, but in the formation of 
personality. 
He held human existence to be a life-long striving for self-
accomplishment. A view reflected in his categories which in 
eschewing logical mediation in favour of passion prefigured 
Heidegger's account of moods. But this influence was mediated 
by Nietzsche, 
Who saw the world as existing in a tension between Dionysian 
and Appollonian instincts best seen in classical Greek drama, 
and that with the advent of Socratic reflection the Apollonian 
instinct was victorious over the Dionysian, yielding a new 
shallower drama, 
To be overcome in the advent of a musical Socrates. The 
difference between the two accounts of Socrates lies in 
Nietzsche's genealogical method, 
P. I2 Which sees truth as illusion ... tracing belief and knowledge 
to their origin in the will to power, 
P. 13-14 So the truth of a doctrine is not seen in what it espouses, 
but in what it denies in its attempt to exact revenge 
against time. 
P. 15 We must ask then how, if at all, Nietzsche's work escapes 
relativism? 
P. I6-20 And see the key to his work 1n the doctrine of the Eternal 
p 0 2I 
P.22 
P.23 
Return, 
An account of which reveals it to be a teaching presented in 
symbol and metaphor of self-overcoming in the absence of the 
Divine, 
A teaching that mediates Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, 
who in his account of truth as aletheia developed an account 
of self-accomplishment and time in the absence of an Absolute. 
Chapter Two. 
Aletheia and the.Hermeneutic Circle. 
Heidegger's response to both Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's 
challenge can be seen in his account of truth as aletheia, 
P.24-25 One he anticipated in his account of his Phenomenology, 
P.26 As seeking to show the inter-relation of revelation and 
concealment. 
P.27-29 But his project would seem circular. His defence against this 
problem rests on his ascription of his problematic as 
transcendental ... a term usually taken as indicative of Kant's 
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Deduction, 
Interpreted nowadays as an attempt to answer scepticism. 
But Heidegger's concern with the Transcendental Deduction 
arose out of his concern with human finitude ... 
As is shown where he clarifies Kant's guiding insight 
showing that Intuition, Understanding and Practical Reason 
are all aspects of the Transcendental Imagination. 
And that the Synthesis of Apprehension, Reproduction and 
Recognition each in turn are an aspect of time, 
And that considered apriori all three syntheses are the work 
of the Transcendental Imagination interpreted as original time. 
Here his analysis has overthrown the Kant ian problematic and .. 
Historicized understanding. 
This interpretation differs from contemporary literature on 
Transcendental arguments. 
In accepting the circularity of Kants arguments Rudiger Bubner 
is one modern author whose view is close to Heidegger's here, 
but differs in that Heidegger took Transcendental Knoweledge 
as the same as Phen0menological Truth ... 
A view broader than Kant's ... which worked out fully in Being 
and Time shows the historical nature of Dasein as reflecting 
the polarity of un/truth at the centre of Heidegger's 
Phenomenological program. 
Bubner's account sees the circularity in transcendental 
reflection but does not consider the nature of truth, 
The historization of which leads to the insight that all 
knowledge is dependent on the revealing - concealing of Being 
itself, and limited to where the individual stands in relation 
to his or her more encompassing tradition. 
Chapter Three. 
Aletheia : Truth as Inwardness in the Absence of an Absolute. 
P.56-58 Kant worked out of the Cartesian subject/object epistemology. 
P.59 In contrast, Heidegger avoided an epistemological stance seeing 
the Transcendental Subject as already embracing the entire 
field of enquiry ... through the Transcendental Ego's self-
affection as the temporalizing of time ... an investigation 
into which 
P.60 Would have to show both the inter-relation of the truth and 
untruth in Dasein 1 s transcendence, and that the correspondence 
theory of truth is derivative of aletheia. 
P.62-63 To show this Heidegger set up an example of a person making an 
assertion and then confirming it ... 
P.64-67 The truth of which lies in assertion being one way of access 
for Dasein to entities, uncoVering them as they are, made 
possible by Dasein's transcendental self-affection ... given 
in mood as self-understanding ... exemplified in Dasein's 
anxiety about its own Being-in-the-world, 
P.68 Which in the absence of an Eternal (God) is given as the 
understood certainty of its mortality, 
P.69-70 Giving Dasein an "earth-bound" teleology in the pursuit of a 
potentiality for existence that preserves self-respect. This 
understanding can be a disowning/untruth or owning/truth of 
the self. 
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For us the prime untruth is the correspondence theory of truth; 
underlying which is an inadequate account of language; which 
sees entities as primarily present-at-hand, and the self in a 
way which Heidegger calls "falling" . 
The latter being overcome in Dasein's call of conscience, 
As a call to what is possible for Dasein in its given 
historical situation seeing entities as firstly ready-to-hand. 
With this account truth interpreted as aletheia is seen as more 
original than the correspondence theory. We can also observe 
that Dasein uncovers both itself and other entities and that 
like Kant, Heidegger developed an account of Transcendental 
Illussion ... and an account of self-knowledge not dissimilar 
to Kierkegaard's. 
Unlike Kierkegaard's view though, Heidegger's account does not 
point to an endless tension between the finite and the infinite 
good ... as under Nietzsche's influence he saw self-discovery 
and intelligibility as given not in the death of God but in the 
mortality of its own being ... 
Which interpreted as the temporality of care is the way Dasein 
is both inside and outside of itself ... either authentically 
or inauthentically, 
Which in turn reveals that time can be thought of either in 
itself or as a series of moments, thereby providing a clue to 
Eternal Return ... 
As a release from the usual experience of time as a series of 
of fleeting moments ... to cling to which is the yearning of 
of the spirit of revenge. 
On reflection the two ways of interpreting time mirror 
Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic time. 
We can now see how Heidegger's account of aletheia answered 
both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in conceiving truth as 
inwardness in the absence of an absolute. This account escapes 
relativism in pointing to the conditions of intelligibility, 
And of shared and genuine knowledge, 
A view denied by Sartre ... but his account falls into 
subjective relativism. In contrast Heidegger's account is 
distinctly non-relativist showing understanding as held open 
to possible review in the face of new insights. 
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Chapter Four. 
Heidegger and Sartre. 
Heidegger and Sartre seem to be pursuing the same question 
but they differ in their accounts of what a phenomenon is ... 
and of what Phenomenology was to acheive. 
Heidegger's inquiry as hermeneutic is marked by self-
referential circularity. Sartre's is fundamentally a dualism, 
Developing a dyadic relation between being-in-itself and being-
for-itself ... an account having counter intuitive consequences, 
Such as belief never being fully attained, and suffering as 
occurring in the presence of a full and total but absent 
suffering in-itself. 
This difference between the two authors is reflected in 
Heidegger's analysis of everyday being in the world, 
Where equipmental break-down reveals the present-at-hand and 
ready-to-hand not as a split, but a unity between two modes of 
being. 
Whilst Heidegger's account seems little different to Sartre's 
it does not collapse Nothing and What-is into a Sartrean 
dialectical duality. 
This difference is reflected in their accounts of temporality, 
Of which Sartre's is strongly reminiscent of Nietzsche's view 
of the perpetual flight of the revengeful spirit, 
Whilst Heidegger's analysis shows not a flight from but 
towards a unity of self. 
Sartre sought an ethical resolution to the goal of unity via a 
"radical conversion", 
A possibility given ln conceiving the structure of the for-
itself as value. 
But this account is untenable and plummets into bad faith. 
The distance between the two authors could not seem greater, 
But for the possibility of interpreting Dasein as human being 
abandoned to the realm of history, 
And historicity as the process of self-making. 
Herein lies the point of entry for the existentialist 
interpretation of the early Heidegger. 
For a different conception to emerge the limitations of the 
traditional influences on Heidegger's thought had to be 
identified and expunged. 
Chapter Five. 
The Turn from Dasien to Being. 
P. 134-5 The evolution of Heidegger' s thought .termed the reversal is not 
unproblematic. 
P. 136-8 It can be demonstrated and interpreted using Idhe's analogy of 
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the field of vision as the relation of ground-to-figure and 
figure-to-ground; as an evolution occurring in definite stages 
on the way to a mature conception of truth as aletheia. 
The lecture "On the Essence of Truth" can be transposed into 
the idiom of Being and Time and illustrated as the ground-
figure relation, 
Where beings are manifest only in the concealment/mystery of 
Being ... and attempt to understand Being as it is in itself 
can be interpreted via the figure-ground relation, as the 
forgetfullness of this concealment. 
Supplementing the analysis of Being and Time the lecture "The 
Origin of the Work of Art", points to the earth as sustaining 
Dasein and to the uncovering - aletheia - of the world in the 
'miracle of art'. 
But as the earth is the withholding of insight in the midst of 
revelation, it is a relation characterized as strife ... 
In this sense art is seen as the origin of Being-there; of 
existence marked by the revealing and concealing contrariety 
of world and earth, 
Which read as the ground-figure relation is a widening of the 
original account of aletheia. 
This is seen in An Introduction to Metaphysics in which can be 
found a unified account of the horizons phenomenon given in the 
analogy of the visual field when it is read simultaneously 
from outside in, and inside out, showing Dasein and Being as 
mutually and integrally related. 
Chapter Six. 
Heidegger's Break with Nietzsche. 
We have seen Nietzsche's influence in Being and Time reflected 
in the account of truth as aletheia ... in the analysis of 
moods, historicity, temporality and in the confounding of the 
Dasein analysis with subjective voluntarism ... an 
interpretation arising from an ambiguity and inadequacy in his 
thinking"~raduallx eliminated, 
By broadening the realm of truth and error beyond the limits of 
the transcendental hermeneutic of Being and Time ... signalled 
in An Introduction to Metaphysics in the idea of waiting for 
the right moment ... as an appropriate response for resolute 
Dasein in the face of Being's manifestation as will to power. 
Heidegger interpreted the Eternal Return and the Will to Power 
as the essence and existence of reality per se, as the securing 
and increasing preservation and enhancement conditionsn. 
And Nietzsche's overman is interpreted as the self thought of 
as self-grounding, 
A result Heidegger interprets not as the reversal but the 
perfection of the Cartesian ego-centrism ... placing Nietzsche 
in the Cartesian tradition ... the anthropocentrism of which is 
seen in Descartes' conception of method as mathematical ... 
P.l82-6 
P. 187-
193 
which contrasts with the original broader Greek sense, 
So that an entity is understood in terms of mere extension, as 
calculable and so quantifiable in nature ... A view Nietzsche 
extended to its limit in the concept of will to power which 
Heidegger's analysis points to as valuative thinking ... the 
essence of modern technology ... as the non-essence or with-
drawal of Being ... not only as the mystery of Being in its 
withdrawal in the manifestation of an entity, 
But also as nihilism in Dasein's forgetfullness of that 
mystery ... seeing entities as "standing reserve" for 
exploitation. Heidegger's counter examples point not to the 
cultivation of pretechnological skills ... which would be 
tantamount to will to power ... but a step back from 
metaphysical thinking ... from the wilful effort to manipulate 
the disclosure of Being. 
Chapter Seven; 
The Turn in History. 
P. 194-5 Heidegger's concern to articulate the relation between Being 
and human being through non-representational thinking is seen 
to necessitate a leap away from traditional thinking .. . 
leading to the problem of how to think non-wilfully ... and 
of what can be so thought. 
P. 196-9 The problem as illustrated by the analogy of the field of 
vision gives us an insight into the shortcomings of Being and 
Time by endeavouring to think the background in terms of what 
it does in respect of the rest of the field ... resulting in a 
reinterpretation of resolve as the willess waiting in openness 
to Being. 
P.200-l Such thinking is as thankful devoted remembrance, a return to 
one 1 s abode in the truth of Being a reinterpretation of 
temporality ... attested in being the result of Heidegger's 
original problematic. 
P.202 In particular the attestation is shown in his search for a 
non-scientific way of thinking in Being and Time as shown in 
his definition of Logos as talk, the call of conscience and 
discourse. 
P.203-4 This search is furthered in later lectures where the Dasein 
analysis is replaced by the poet ... who responds to the call 
of the gods ... a relation that exercised Heidegger's 
remaining career. 
P.205-6 A relation pursued in the context of Holderlin's poetic vision 
... wherein poetic utterance has priority over everyday 
speech, and attention is focussed on the return of God in 
another beginning ... as presented in his account of the four-
fold. 
P.207 In this account the Being of entities is seen to lie in their 
usefulness given from out of the inter-relation of the earth, 
the sky, the divine and mortals, 
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A fourfold now disimulated in the face of the will to power .. 
To respond to the call of the Gods is the hearing of the four-
fold as a mortal ... and saying as primal logos is the 
gathering of the fourfold into their mutual inter-play. 
This attempt to think the nature of logos affords an insight 
into the continuity of Heidegger' s thought ... so the major 
characteristic of the turn can be seen as his idea of a new 
beginning to history through poetical hearing and saying. 
A view which revises the earlier account of the circle of 
understanding ... by indicating the essential difference 
between speaking in response to Being, and speaking about 
language. 
But Heidegger's position here is disingenuous ... a position 
accentuated by his criticism of Junger ... revealing the 
perhaps final influence of Nietzsche. 
This is a criticism supported by Gadamer, who sees that as 
Heidegger 1 s work call$ on tradition to communicate his 
findings, his account of the total obliviion of Being, and of 
a radically new beginning to history must be sidestepped. 
This criticism implies that Being may reveal more of itself 
than at present,and that the fullness and absence of Being 
point to the possibilities between which human existence 
wavers. In accord with this view Heidegger's lectures indicate 
not a new beginning, but the possibility of a greater 
awareness of the mystery of Being. In terms of Heidegger's 
account of truth as aletheia such an interpretation restores 
the reciprocity of Being and human existence to historicity 
in the handing down of tradition, 
Leaving philosophy the task of respecting the mystery 1n 
plumbing the "what" and "how" of Being's historical 
disclosure. 
